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ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE IN ILLINOIS:
AN EARLY CHAPTER IN A BOOK
DESTINED FOR GREAT LENGTH
CARL

E.

KASTEN*

INTRODUCTION

Across America, the filing of legal malpractice suits is proliferating. Recognized as a tort nearly a century ago in Illinois, legal malpractice as a cause of action was rarely used by
consumers of legal services until its rebirth in the late 1960's and
the 1970's. The reasons advanced for the dramatic increase in
legal malpractice suits are both numerous and varied.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to determine
whether or to what extent a given factor has caused this increase, the numerous rationales include: (1) American society
is becoming increasingly litigious; (2) publicity, advertising, and
the media have created client expectations of the specialist's expertise even though specialties are not officially recognized; (3)
the better-educated client is more aware of the competence or
incompetence of his lawyer; (4) lawyers, while greater in
number, are generally not as adequately trained; (5) the bar has
failed to require continuing legal education; (6) the bar has
failed to adopt specializiation; (7) the number of cases has
greatly increased, burdening both the bench and bar; (8) attorneys are more willing to bring suit or testify against a fellow lawyer; and (9) the law, to lawyers and laymen alike, has become
extremely complex.
Whatever the underlying causes of legal malpractice actions, their manifestations now surround us. They affect every
sector of the legal community, including attorneys filing and defending malpractice suits or appearing as expert witnesses, and
those fearful of their own liability who seek and purchase malpractice insurance. Because malpractice claims are increasingly successful,' and the recovery amount on the average claim
*J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1969; B.A., Illinois State
University, 1966. Mr. Kasten is currently a partner with the law firm of
Phelps, Carmody &Kasten in Carlinville, Illinois. The author is presently a
member of the Board of Managers of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
1. See Luvera, Avoiding Legal Malpractice,CASE & COM. 3 (Sept.-Oct.
1975): "Successful claims against attorneys have increased by twenty-five
(25%) percent in the last five years."
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is growing,2 the rise in malpractice premiums has been dra3
matic.
The growth of legal malpractice is also revealed by the
wealth of legal literature it has spawned. Prior to 1970 there was
a paucity of articles on the subject. In a decade's time, numerous works have discussed both the rebirth of malpractice ac-4
tions and the reasons underlying their renewed application.
Some authors and jurists have expressed fears that malpractice
does not accomplish that which it was designed to prevent, in
that it erects a barrier to practice (in the form of ability to pay
5
premiums) and insulates attorneys from their defalcations.
Although the rebirth of legal malpractice began in the 1960's
in California, its re-emergence in Illinois became the subject of
concern for the bar by 1970.6 The midwest's prior insulation7
from widespread malpractice actions has begun to deteriorate.
It is apparent, therefore, that whatever the sources of or reasons
for legal malpractice, 8 such actions have been accepted and will
be pursued by members of the Illinois bar.
2. The N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 44, col. 1, reported that Continental
National American Insurance Company had processed about double the
number of claims over the previous 4 years and that the average claim had
gone from $4,500 to $7,000.
3. The cost of basic malpractice protection afforded the author has increased 400% since 1971 and 278% since 1975. See Braverman, The Cost of
Mistake May Go Higher, 65 ILL. B.J. 196 (1976); Nitz, The Cause and Prevention of Increasing ProfessionalLiability Insurance Premiumsfor Lawyers,
54 CHI. B. REC. 390 (1973). In certain states, attorneys have experienced cost
increases of more than 600% over the past several years. Stern, Legal Malpractice: Are You Really Protected By Your MalpracticePolicy?, 14 TRIAL.
23 (Dec. 1978).
4. R.

MALLEN

& V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1977).

5. See generally Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal MalpracticeDilemma:
Will New Standards of Care Place ProfessionalLiability Insurance Beyond
the Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 541, 560-61 (1976).
6. See Blaine, Professional Liability Claims: An Increasing Concern
for Lawyers, 59 ILL. B.J. 302 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Increasing Concern
for Lawyers].
7. Mossner, The Legal Malpractice Case, 14 TRIAL 18 (Sept. 1978).
8. See IncreasingConcernfor Lawyers, supra note 6, at 305, which indicates that approximately 43% of the malpractice claims processed in 1970 in
Illinois arose from and involved the "time-element" category, such as limitations and filing dates, 21% involved contractual agreements and 20% involved real estate transactions, while 16% made up all other areas of
malpractice. In 1977, 46.3% of Illinois malpractice claims arose from the
"time-element" lapse. Braverman, How About Reducing Lawyer Malpractice Claims By 50 Percent, 67 ILL. B.J. 365 (1979). A 1978 study of eleven
southern states reveals that only 24% of the malpractice claims were in the
areas of personal injury representation, appellate practice, and other trial
work. The study also revealed that of those claims against trial lawyers,
82% occur because of administrative and clerical errors. Only 4.82% were
attributable to skill or ability in trials or appeals. See Stern, Legal Malpractice: Are You Really Protected By Your Malpractice Policy?, 15 TRIAL 37
(Jan. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Stern].
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THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE

The elements of the tort of legal malpractice are widely recognized as: (1) the presence of an attorney-client relationship;
(2) a duty owed to the plaintiff; (3) a breach of that duty through
the attorney's failure to exercise the proper degree of care; (4) a
proximate causal connection between the attorney's negligent
conduct and the resulting injury; and (5) an injury or damage to
the plaintiff.9 While the elements of the cause of action are not
in dispute, their ascertainment and application often create confusion and conflict. A review of each separate element is therefore necessary in order to understand the tort of legal
malpractice.
The limited scope of this article does not permit a comprehensive consideration of all of these elements as interpreted in
other jurisdictions or as applied to other professions. Insofar as
it is helpful or necessary to define the issues or provide guidelines for Illinois attorneys, however, there will be an examination of the law of other jurisdictions and other professional
malpractice actions.
Attorney-Client Relationship
The existence of an attorney-client relationship is readily
ascertainable when an attorney accepts a fee or executes a contract of employment with a client. But what of other, less clear
situations? The mere offer of retainer by a client consummates
such a relationship, 10 and the payment of money is not essential
to create the "retainer"" or offer of employment. Even a gratuitous rendition of services gives rise to an attorney-client relationship. 12 An attorney's statement that he will "look into the
matter" and then advise the consumer on whether he will accept
the case creates a relationship during the pendency of the "inquiry."'13 Once a legal consumer has sought an attorney for his
advice, opinion, or services, no express "acceptance" by the at9. Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Schorr &Solis-Cohen, 463 F. Supp. 914 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (attorney-client relationship must exist); Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158
N.J. Super. 158, 385 A.2d 913 (1978) (elements of cause of action); Hansen v.
Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975) (same).
10. DeWolf v. Strader, 26 Ill. 225, 79 Am. Dec. 371 (1861); 4 ILL. L. PRAC.
Attorneys and Counselors § 9, at 149 (1953 & Supp. 1979).
11. Johnston v. Brown, 51 Ill. App. 549 (1893); see Ferri v. Ackerman, 100
S. Ct. 402 (1979) (indigent criminal defendant stated cause of action in

Pennsylvania state court for professional malpractice of court-appointed
counsel in federal criminal trial; the attorney not being entitled to an absolute immunity arising out of his appointment).
12. Fort Meyers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe &Johnson, 381 F.2d 261,
262, 18 A.L.R.3d 974, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
13. Tormo v. Yormak, 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975).
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14
torney is required to create a fiduciary relationship.
Although the cases defining the inception of the attorneyclient relationship are over a century old, the policy reasons
supporting them are valid, perhaps even more so, in today's consumer-oriented world. Because an attorney is in the business of
dispensing legal advice and taking legal action, he is presumably
in a better position to determine whether immediate steps are
required, and if so, which ones. A client, having chosen to employ a particular attorney, presumably anticipates paying for the
reasonable value of services rendered even if there is no express
contract. A client is therefore justified in expecting that his attorney will take appropriate and immediate action if the facts
warrant it.
Once a relationship is created, the attorney's employment
ordinarily continues during the pendency of the matter for
which he was engaged, unless the attorney or his client dies in
the interim. 15 A client may discharge his attorney at any time
with or without cause. However, an attorney who accepts employment cannot, without just cause, abandon his client before
resolution of the matter, and even with just cause, must provide
6
his client reasonable opportunity to procure other counsel.'
The following have been held to be "good cause," sufficient to
justify an attorney's termination of the relationship: the existence of irreconcilable differences between the attorney and client regarding the conduct of the client's case;' 7 the failure to pay
fees which are both agreed to and accrued, so long as trial is not
imminent; 8 discovery of a conflict of interest not reasonably discernible at the commencement of the relationship;' 9 and the cli20
ent's failure to heed his lawyer's advice.

Even when an attorney has just cause to terminate the rela14. Generally, the burden is on the alleged client to prove that a relationship existed, for purposes of a legal malpractice action. E.g., Hansen v.
Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975). See Neville v. Davinroy,
41 Ill. App. 3d 706, 355 N.E.2d 86 (1976), where legal advice and other services
rendered over the course of several years by an attorney to his friend, with-

out an agreement as to compensation, was held to create an attorney-client
relationship.
15. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text infra.

16. Bergman v. Hedges, 111 Ill. App. 2d 35, 38, 249 N.E.2d 666, 668 (1969);
accord, Goldberg v. Goldberg, 27 Ill. App. 3d 94, 99, 327 N.E.2d 299, 303
(1975).

17. Custom Builders, Inc. v. Clemons, 52 Ill. App. 3d 399, 367 N.E.2d 537
(1977).

18. Cairo &St. L. R.R. v. Kroerner, 3 Ill. App. 248 (1878).
19. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
20. The individual lawyer is given the choice of continuing to represent
his client, or of telling the client that he cannot, so that new counsel may be
obtained. Thode, The Ethical Standardfor the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REV.

575, 582 (1961).
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tionship, sufficiency of notice of termination and the client's opportunity to procure other counsel are taken into account by
courts before an attorney is released from his obligations. The
proximity of trial or other proceeding substantially affecting the
client's rights is largely determinative. As a general rule, courts
will not permit withdrawal during or on the eve of trial; withdrawal is granted more freely when the time of notice to the client and the motion to withdraw greatly antedates the time of
trial. The trial court is vested with great discretion in this area
complexity
and is expected to consider all relevant facts and the
21
of the particular case before reaching its decision.
Liability may attach if an attorney abandons his client in
contravention of court order. In Public Taxi Service, Inc. v. Barrett,22 an attorney's motions for leave to withdraw were denied.
The attorney nonetheless abandoned his clients and permitted
their adversaries to obtain default judgments which were not vacated. In those circumstances, the court found that the abandoned clients had a cause of action against the attorney.
Similarly, liability may attach when an attorney gives ineffective notice of termination to his client. In Central Cab Co. v.
Clarke,23 a Maryland court held that when a defense attorney
accepts a file from an insurance company, an attorney-client relationship is created not only with the referring insurer but also
with the insured.24 In Clarke, the attorney had decided not to
proceed because he could not be assured of payment. He sent
effective notice of termination to the insurer. He also sent a
copy of that letter to the insured, but it was misdirected and returned to the attorney who sought no further contact with the
insured. The court found that the attorney-client relationship
continued under those circumstances, and the attorney was
held liable to the insured.
Case law in Illinois and elsewhere indicates that whenever
there is doubt as to the efficacy of termination of the relationship, resolution will normally be against the attorney. This is at
least partially attributable to the fiduciary nature of the relationship. An attorney owes his client the duty of loyalty, at least
until the relationship is properly terminated and the client is
protected. Courts rationalize the imposition of this duty on the
basis that since an attorney knows the facts and has superior
knowledge of their legal effect, the burden of effectuating an adequate termination of the relationship should rest with the at21. Bergman v. Hedges, 111 Ill. App. 2d 35, 38, 249 N.E.2d 666, 668 (1969).
22. 44 Ill.
App. 3d 452, 357 N.E.2d 1232 (1976).
23. 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970).

24. Id. at 547, 270 A.2d at 666.
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The Duty Owed
Illinois courts apply the standard of care enunciated in 1934
in Olson v. North.26 The Olson court held that when a person
adopts the profession of law and performs duties on behalf of
another, he will be held to employ in his undertakings a reasonable degree of skill and care.27 He must possess the ordinary
legal knowledge and skill common to members of the legal profession and act with the reasonable care and diligence usually
exercised by lawyers. 28 While liability will attach for breach of
this duty, courts distinguish between negligent errors and those
of mere mistaken judgment, the latter not constituting a basis
for malpractice. 29 Additionally, the fact that an attorney was unsuccessful in an undertaking creates no presumption of negligence; on the contrary, the rule is that practitioners are
presumed to have properly discharged their duties until the con30
trary has been proved.
Locality Rule
While many principles of "duty" created in medical mal25. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(2)
imposes a duty to protect the welfare of a client by giving due notice, allowing time for employment of other counsel, and cooperating with new
counsel by delivering all papers and property to which the client is entitled.
In light of the fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship, the protection of the client's interests is properly of paramount concern.
26. 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
27. Id. at 473.
28. Id. In Olson, among other claims made by the plaintiff was the fail-

ure of the attorney to properly present evidence and to conduct proper

cross-examination. In some states, and in England, such claims, as a matter
of law, are inadequate to state a cause of action. See Meagher v. Kauli, 256
Minn. 54, 97 N.W.2d 370 (1959); Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn.
App. 1977) (citing Rondel v. Worsley, 1 All E.R. 467 (1966 C.A.), 3 All E.R. 657
and (1967 H.L.) 3 All E.R. 993). For further discussion regarding liability for
trial tactics, see text accompanying notes 51-56 infra.
29. In Morrison v. Burnett, 56 Ill. App. 129 (1894), the standard was declared as follows:
An attorney is required to use such skill and prudence as lawyers
of ordinary ability and care would exercise, and for failing therein, he is
liable to his client for any proximate loss thereby occasioned; but, he is
not answerable for an error of judgment upon nice or difficult points,
nor for every mistake which may occur in practice.
Id. at 135. See also Dorf v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1966); House v.
Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 71, 360 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1977); Brown v. Gitlin, 19
Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1020, 313 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1974); Mecartney v. Wallace, 214
Ill. App. 618, 624 (1919).
30. Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 617, 85 N.E. 940, 942 (1908).
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practice have been applied to legal malpractice, 3 1 disparities do
exist. One major difference concerns the locality rule, which in
medical malpractice actions requires that the physician use that
"skill and care ordinarily used by reasonably well-qualified doctors in the locality in which he practices. '32 It had been assumed that the locality rule would be inapplicable to legal
malpractice, thereby resulting in a state-wide standard, because
the only admission requirement was a test administered on a
state-wide basis. 33 However, some courts seem to have implic34
itly accepted the locality rule in legal malpractice actions.
Specialization
Another distinction between medical and legal malpractice
concerns specialization. Specialization has been recognized in
the medical profession for decades but has not yet been accepted by the legal profession. A step in this direction has been
taken by permitting attorneys to publish the fact that they "concentrate" or "limit" their practices to specific areas of the law;
however, they may not refer to themselves as "specialists. '35 In
addition, attorneys must indicate that "the State of Illinois does
not provide for recognition or certification as a specialist in such
area or field of law. '36 Because Illinois does not recognize legal
specialization, it is doubtful whether the specialist's duty can be
applied to an attorney's actions, even when he "concentrates"
37
his practice in one particular field.
In Olson v. North,38 it was claimed that the attorney represented himself as "especially qualified in the defense of criminal
cases, including murder cases. '39 Nevertheless, the court held
the attorney only to the standard of reasonable and ordinary
care common to the legal profession in general. 40 It appears that
two of Olson's underlying assumptions are currently in conflict:
31. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 475 (1934).
32. I.P.I. 2d § 105.01, Duty of Physician, Surgeon, Dentist (1971).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 704 (1977); Mossner, The Legal Malpractice Case, 14 TRIAL 20, 21 (Sept. 1978). It should be noted, however, that
those experts testifying in Olson v. North and Smiley v. Manchester Ins. &
Indem. Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1977), affd, 71 Ill. 2d 306, 375
N.E.2d 118 (1978), testified as to the standards of attorneys in the community.

34. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934); accord, Smiley v. Manchester
Ins. &Indem. Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1977), affd, 71 III. 2d 306,
375 N.E.2d 118 (1978).
35. ISBA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS, OPINIONS, No. 617 (1978).
36. Id.
37. I.P.I. 2d § 105.02, Duty of Specialist (1971).

38. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
39. Id. at 461.
40. Id.
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(1) the rules of law and evidence regarding liability of lawyers
should be the same as those for doctors, surgeons, and dentists;
and (2) even if a professional claims to be a specialist, he will
41
only be held to the standard of care of a general practitioner.
In the context of the largely unspecialized bar and less regulated society of the 1930's, Olson and its statement of the attorney's duty was correct. However, the passage of one half
century, and the development of a more specialized bar and a
regulated society, have brought the viability of Olson into question. The informal development of legal specialties creates a
strong argument that those who specialize should be held to a
specialist's standard of care, rather than the standards required
of a general practitioner.
Legal advertising is fait accompli.42 Across the nation, attorneys increasingly hold themselves out to both the public and
the bar as possessing expertise. National and international law
firms grow in size and number by the day. Despite laudable efforts to simplify government rules and regulations, the complexity of federal and state laws and regulations increases.
In this environment, if the lawyer specializes, holding himself out as "concentrating" in a given area, and is viewed by the
public and the bar as a specialist, why should he not be held to a
specialist's standard of care? It has been held that a lawyer accepting a case with out-of-state consequences must maintain
and exercise the skill of one practicing in the state of occurrence. 4 3 It would seem that Olson's general holding that the
rules of law and evidence should be identical in medical and legal malpractice requires that the standard of care for a legal
"specialist" parallel that of his medical counterpart, even though
he is not formally certified or recognized as a "specialist.""
41. While it may be assumed that the standard of care of a general practitioner may be less than of the legal specialist, it is not necessarily true in
practice. In my own observation, many times general practitioners who adequately prepare in a given area perform even better services than some
who claim to be specialists. The general practitioner does not seem to suffer the legal myopia of the specialist and sometimes perceives other effects

of a transaction or outcome more clearly.
42. Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978), for first amendment claims relating to solicitation of and information
provided for clients. Not all advertising is protected in Illinois, even for chiropractors. See Talsky v. Department of Regist. & Educ., 68 Ill. 2d 579, 370
N.E.2d 173 (1977).
43. Dorf v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1966) (citing Mock v. Higgins, 3 Ill. App. 2d 281, 292, 121 N.E.2d 865, 870 (1954)).

44. Interestingly, two recent California cases seemingly so indicate. In
Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975), a maritime

case, the plaintiffs lost their lawsuit because they failed to sustain their burden of proof; but the court said: "[A] lawyer holding himself out to the pub-
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Referral
In this era of informal specialization and increased government regulation, there are few practitioners who possess detailed knowledge of the many increasingly complex areas of the
law. Referrals to and associations with other attorneys have become prevalent. Despite this practice, Illinois courts have not as
yet addressed the issue of whether an attorney has a legal duty
to refer a client to an attorney with expertise in a particular legal
field. The disciplinary rules state that "[a] lawyer shall not handle a legal matter which he knows that he is not competent to
handle without associating with him a lawyer who is competent
to handle it," 45 but the lack of recognized specialists makes the
selection process difficult.
In medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff is entitled to an
instruction which provides that:
If in the treatment of a patient a doctor realizes or in the exercise of that care and skill which a reasonably well-qualified doctor
would ordinarily use in the locality in which he practices should
realize that the nature of the patient's condition requires the services of a physician skilled in a special branch of medical science,
is under a duty to advise the patient to consult a
then the doctor
46
specialist.
Therefore, if the general standards of professional malpractice
47
apply to both legal and medical negligence, as Olson indicates,
the duty to refer or associate should attach to legal malpractice
as well.
Except for those few specialties recognized under Illinois
law, 48 there are no de jure specialists-only de facto or self-declared experts. Since there are currently no minimum competency examinations, mandatory continuing legal education
programs, or other standards for specialty certification in Illinois, a referring attorney has no clear guidelines to assist him in
selecting a competent specialist. The duty to refer would be
lic and the profession as specializing in an area of the law must exercise the

skill, prudence and diligence exercised by other specialists of ordinary skill
and capacity specializing in the same field." Id. at 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
Id. at 805, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 196. In Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d

589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), no officially recognized legal specialty was involved, yet the court made note of the defendant-lawyer's experience in
community property pension matters and examined his conduct in light of
the activities of those in his profession similarly situated.
45. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrY DR 6-101(A)(1) (1975).
46. I.P.I. 2d § 105.03, Duty to Refer Patient to Specialist (1971).

47. See text accompanying notes 38-45 supra.
48. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-105 (1975). This
section permits a lawyer to hold himself out as specializing in the fields of
patents, trademarks, or admiralty.
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49
more readily fulfilled if certified specialists were available.

Trial Tactics
A 1978 study disclosed that less than 5% of all claims against
trial lawyers result from a lack of skill or ability at trial or on
appeal.5 0 However, the theoretical difficulties present in this
small number of cases are very real. Some of the instances of
malpractice alleged in Olson v. North were the failures to call
certain witnesses and properly cross-examine others, and the
refusal to ask certain questions. When expert testimony indicates such nonfeasance was negligent, Illinois allows recovery
51
for the injury caused.
This rule has been criticized. In Stricklan v. Koella,52 a Tennessee court ruled that while a lawyer is liable for professional
negligence, a cause of action does not arise when the alleged
negligence is in the attorney's choice of trial tactics or conduct
of the case. The court, noting that Great Britain had rejected
the imposition of liability for a claim of negligent trial strategy,
quoted at length from the observations of an English judge:
Every counsel in practice knows that daily he is faced with the
question whether in his client's interest he should raise a new issue, put another witness in the box, or ask further questions of the
witness whom he is examining or cross-examining. That is seldom
an easy question but I think that most experienced counsel would
agree that the golden rule is-when in doubt, stop. Far more cases
have been lost by going on too long than by stopping too soon. But
the client does not know that. To him brevity may indicate incompetence or negligence and stopping too soon is an error of judgment. So I think it not at all improbable that the possibility of
being sued for negligence would at least subconsciously lead some
counsel to undue prolixity, which would not only be harmful
53 to the
client but against the public interest in prolonging trials.
The Stricklan court concluded that in all negligence cases
there must be a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the injury. In a suit where the alleged negligence is
manifested in the attorney's presentation of proof, "only by pure
49. In August, 1977, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America established a National Board of Trial Advocacy which has proposed national
standards for certification of civil and criminal trial advocates. The applicant would have to meet all state requirements as a prerequisite to compliance with NBTA standards. For a full discussion of this effort to establish a

national trial competency standard and certification program in 1978, see

Koskoff, Specialization Update, 14 TRIAL 21 (Feb. 1979).
50. Stern, supra note 9, at 37.
51. I.P.I. 2d § 105.01, Duty of Physician,Surgeon, Dentist (1971). This instruction should be readily amenable to application to legal malpractice.
52. 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. App. 1977).
53. Id. at 813 (citing Rondel v. Worsley, 1 All. E.R. 467 (1966 C.A.), 3 All
E.R. 657 and (1967 H.L.) 3 All E.R. 993).
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guesswork can the verdict be examined and a so-called cause for
that verdict be determined. '54 The court held that there can be
no cause of action against an attorney arising out of the manner
in which "he honestly chooses to present his client's case to the
'55
trier of the facts.
The rule announced in Stricklan optimally balances the client's interests with those of his attorney. It allows a lawyer to
serve as both advocate and officer of the court. Additionally, it
permits him to develop his own style without concern as to what
his client might claim he could, might, or should have done.
However, the Stricklan rule should not be used to shield attorneys from all of their negligent acts. When an attorney fails
to adduce evidence, known by him to exist, which is probative of
an essential element of his client's case not otherwise established, this negligence should be the basis of liability. Adequate
protection for the attorney would be afforded by the necessity of
expert witnesses produced by the plaintiff. A causal connection
between negligence and damages would, of course, have to be
established before liability would be imposed.
Settlement
Another area of potential liability for the litigation attorney
is the process of settlement and compromise. 56 In Smiley v.
Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co.,57 the attorney failed on
several occasions to communicate to his adversaries that he had
authority to settle the wrongful death and personal injury actions. Additionally, he refused to settle for specific amounts
within the policy limits. The Illinois Appellate Court concluded
that the attorney's inaction caused the insurer to incur liability
for bad faith negotiations in attempting to settle the disputed
58
claims within the policy limits, and held the attorney liable.
The question of the adequacy of a settlement has not arisen
in Illinois. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, recently rejected clients' claims that their attorney had recommended settlement for an insufficient amount.5 9 That court held that when
an attorney is fully informed of the factors in the decisionmak54. Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d at 813.
55. Id. at 814.
56. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 168 (1978).
57. 49 Ill.
App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1977).
58. Id. at 680, 364 N.E.2d at 687; cf.Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan,

Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979) (law firm,
which represented both insured and insurer without disclosing conflict of

interest in that insurer wanted to settle and insured did not, breached duty
to insured).
59. Glenna v. Sullivan, 245 N.W.2d 869, 87 A.L.R.3d 160 (Minn. 1976).
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ing process and acts in the honest belief that his advice is well
founded and in the best interests of his clients, he will not be
held liable for an error or mistake in judgment.60
Research
The extent of a lawyer's duty to research has yet to be determined in Illinois. While it is clear that a lawyer cannot be required to forecast developments in Illinois law, 61 our courts have
not discussed the duty to adequately research novel or unresolved issues. In Smith v. Lewis,62 however, the California
Supreme Court held that an attorney is not only expected to
"possess knowledge of those plain and elementary principles of
law which are commonly known by well-informed lawyers," but
also "to discover those additional rules of law, which, although
not commonly known, may readily be found by standard re63
search techniques" even in unsettled areas of the law.
To Whom Is the Duty Owed?
Obviously, a lawyer owes a duty to his client. 64 Is that the
extent of his obligation? Illinois has not yet provided an answer.
Although contractual privity has traditionally been deemed necessary,65 the modern trend indicates that if the transaction was
intended to affect third persons, and if an injury to a non-client
was reasonably foreseeable at the time the legal services were
performed, the attorney can be held liable to one he technically
was not representing.
One area in which this duty has been extended to third persons is testamentary dispositions. An attorney has been held to
owe a duty to beneficiaries under a will prepared by him, and
the lack of privity did not automatically operate as a bar to the
plaintiffs' recovery. 66 A beneficiary may proceed either in tort or
for breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary. 67 The only
60. Id. at 872-73, 87 A.L.R.3d at 166.
61. Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1021, 313 N.E.2d 180, 183 (1974).
62. 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
63. Id. at 358, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
64. Wade, Public Responsibilitiesof the Learned Professions,21 LA. L.
130, 131-35 (1960).

REV.

65. See Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
66. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
824 (1961). Lucas involved a doctrine close to the hearts of all lawyers and
law students; namely, the Rule Against Perpetuities. The court stated that

attorneys are "not liable for being in error as to a question of law on which
reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers" and ruled
for the defendant-attorney. Id. at 589, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
67. Id. at 588, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824; accord, Licata v.

Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966); see W.L. Douglas Shoe Co. v.
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conditions that must be met before liability may be imposed are
that the plaintiff must have been an intended beneficiary, the
transaction must have been intended to affect him, and the
harm suffered must have been reasonably foreseeable. 68
Proofof Breach of Duty
Generally, the rules of evidence governing the trial of medical malpractice actions are applicable in legal malpractice
suits. 69 Evidentiary rules are modified only when it is necessary
to accommodate differences in the two professions. The standard of care against which a professional's actions are measured
must generally be based on expert testimony.70 In fact, failure
to supply expert testimony may be a "death knell" for the plaintiff.7 1

One exception to the general rule requiring expert testimony was recognized in medical malpractice actions involving
negligence "so grossly apparent or in the treatment of such a
common occurrence that a layman would have no difficulty appraising it. ' ' 72 This "gross negligence" rule was accepted in legal
malpractice actions in House v. Maddox,73 where the court determined that the attorney's failure to file within the applicable
statute of limitations was so grossly apparent that laymen would
have no difficulty in appraising it.7 4 By analogy, it is arguable
that failure to timely file tax returns on routine transactions and
the passing of other widely-recognized time deadlines would fall
within the "gross negligence" rule.
In questioning expert witnesses, the relevant inquiry is not
whether the actions of an attorney were negligent, but whether
his conduct was that which other reputable lawyers would have
Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841 (1933); Woodfork v. Saunders, 248 So.
2d 419 (La. App. 1971); McEnvoy v. Helikson, 227 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977);
Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P.2d 265 (1930).
68. See Ventura County Humane Soc'y v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897,
903, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (1974).
69. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
70. Id.; accord, Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill.
App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1974).
71. Bonhiver v. Rotenberg, Schwartzman & Richards, 461 F.2d 925 (7th
Cir. 1972); Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966); Walski v. Tiesenga, 72

Ill. 2d 249, 381 N.E.2d 279 (1978); Schmidt v. Hinshaw, Culbertson, Meolmann, Hoban &Fuller, 75 Ill. App. 3d 516, 394 N.E.2d 559 (1979); Brainerd v.
Kates, 68 Ill. App. 3d 781, 386 N.E.2d 586 (1979).
72. Graham v. St. Luke's Hosp., 46 Ill. App. 2d 147,158, 196 N.E.2d 355, 360
(1964); accord, Dimitrijevic v. Chicago Wesley Mem. Hosp., 92 Ill.
App. 2d
251, 259, 236 N.E.2d 309, 313 (1968).
73. 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977).
74. Id. at 73, 360 N.E.2d at 584; accord, Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777

(Ky. 1956); Watkins v. Shepard, 278 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1973); Central Cab
Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970).
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pursued under similar circumstances. 75 In Bonhiver v. Rotenberg, Schwartzman & Richard,76 the court rejected the assumption that judges, being lawyers, could take judicial notice of how
other reputable practitioners would have acted under the circumstances. Relying on People v. Wallenberg,77 the Bonhiver
court held that a judge could not rely on his independent knowledge of facts, and that if he did utilize that knowledge, it would
constitute a denial of due process. 78 Therefore, it appears that
any judicial notice based on a judge's prior legal experience
would be improper.
In medical malpractice actions, expert witnesses may be
cross-examined regarding the views of recognized authorities
expressed 'in professional treatises or periodicals. The author's
competence can be established by an expert witness or by judicial notice. 79 While the use of treatises and periodicals in legal
malpractice litigation has not been discussed by Illinois courts,
there is no valid reason why they should not constitute evidence
if they are subject to the limitations employed in medical malpractice actions.
Finally, the questions arise whether, in the absence of formal specialization, a general practitioner could testify as an expert witness against a de facto specialist and whether this de
facto specialist could testify against the general practitioner. In
medical malpractice actions, courts have held that a doctor
otherwise qualified by experience or training in the field of
medicine involved is not barred from testifying as an expert
80
merely because he is not a certified specialist in that field.
Once specialization is recognized among lawyers, the same test
should be used. The determinative factor should be experience
or training in the problem area litigated.
75. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. at 458.
76. 461 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1972).

77. 24 Ill. 2d 350, 181 N.E.2d 143 (1962).
78. 461 F.2d at 928. In Wallenberg, the Illinois Supreme Court held that

in a criminal case any determination made by a trial judge based upon a
private investigation by the court or based upon private knowledge of the
court, untested by cross-examination or any of the rules of evidence, denied
due process. 24 Ill. 2d at 354, 181 N.E.2d at 145.
79. Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253, 14 A.L.R.3d 860 (1965).
80. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1163, 1167 (1965); cf. Dolan v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill. 2d

279, 396 N.E.2d 13 (1979) (physician could not testify as to podiatrist's standard of care unless he was also a licensed podiatrist; non-specialist could
testify as to diagnosis of plaintiff's present condition and prognosis for recovery).
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Causation
The majority of states, including Illinois, adhere to the "case
within a case" requirement. For a plaintiff to prevail, he must
prove not only that his attorney was negligent, but also that disregarding the negligence, the plaintiff had a meritorious claim. 81
Therefore, he must prove the elements of the underlying cause
of action. If the plaintiff would have been unsuccessful on the
merits of the underlying action, the attorney will not be held liable, regardless of the extent of his negligence. 82 In addition to
proving both the attorney's negligence and the merits of the underlying action, Illinois law requires proof that the original defendant was solvent.83 If the plaintiff could not have collected
on the judgment from the original defendant, it is reasoned that
the attorney's negligence could not have caused the plaintiff any
damage.
Because the objective of reviewing the underlying action is
to prove what would have occurred had the attorney not been
negligent, the original trial must be recreated as accurately as
possible. While Illinois courts have not yet passed on the question, it is arguable that if the original action was tried before a
jury, the subsequent trial on the underlying action should also
be heard by a jury. Similarly, if a jury was waived in the original
action, the court should decide the merits of the underlying action.
Because legal malpractice actions essentially consist of two
separate actions, authors have suggested that separate trials be
held, one for the underlying action and one to resolve the negligence issue. 84 Evidentiary divisions would be less complicated
because the purpose for which evidence would be offered would
already be defined by the scope of the trial.85 Also, bifurcated
81. Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908); Piper v. Green,
216 Ill. App. 590 (1920). One caveat to the general rule that the client has
the burden of showing proximate cause should be noted. In cases-arising
from lawyer-client transactions, the burden of proof is always on the lawyer
to show the fairness of the transaction. Vrooman v. Hawbaker, 387 Ill. 428,
56 N.E.2d 623 (1944); Jacobsen v. National Bank of Austin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 135,
289 N.E.2d 253 (1972); Gromer v. Hahn, 97 Ill. App. 2d 276, 240 N.E.2d 138
(1968). This rule is not unlike other fiduciary cases requiring the fiduciary
to exercise loyalty and fidelity to his principal.
82. Trustees of Schools of Township 42 N. v. Schroeder, 2 Ill. App. 3d
1009, 1013, 278 N.E.2d 431, 433 (1971); accord, Chicago Red Top Cab Ass'n v.
Gaines, 49 Ill. App. 3d 332, 364 N.E.2d 328 (1977).
83. See Piper v. Green, 216 Ill. App. 590 (1920); Goldzier v. Poole, 82 Ill.
App. 469 (1898).
84.

E.g., R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 432 (1977).

85. See Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 675, 364
N.E.2d 683 (1977), aOd, 71 Ill. 2d 306, 375 N.E.2d 118 (1978). The Smiley court
struggled with two conflicting rules: (1) offers of compromise are inadmissi-
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trials would be less cumbersome and would be easier for the
jury to understand. Bifurcation would tend to provide a distinct
definition of damages. While opponents of bifurcated trials
claim that clarity may be furnished in a single trial via special
interrogatories, the potential for jury misunderstanding is
greater in a single trial of all issues.
Of primary concern to the defendant-lawyer is the possibility that his former client may obtain a larger verdict in the malpractice action than he could have in the first action, for reasons
wholly unrelated to the attorney's negligence. The second jury
might be more liberal, the dollar might be worth less at the time
of the second trial, the circumstances of the parties might have
changed, or the attorney might be a target defendant. While
these factors may work to the detriment of the attorney, they
pervade our trial system, and parties in every case are subject to
the same vagaries of justice. It is also possible that these factors
could work to the attorney's advantage.
Damages

Recent Illinois cases indicate that proof of the plaintiff's
damages may be established by the defendant-attorney's own
actions or by a prior course of dealing between the plaintiff and
the party against whom the plaintiff had the underlying claim.
While plaintiff is always entitled to prove the injury in the same
manner that he would have in trying the underlying cause of
action,86 abbreviated methods of proving damages have been accepted. One example of a short-cut method of proof was employed in House v. Maddox,87 where an insurer offered the
plaintiff $8,000 for her claim and raised the offer to $16,500 after
she retained the defendant-attorney. Because the attorney allowed the statute of limitations period to lapse before filing suit,
the court allowed the facts themselves to support the claim for
88
damages.
Similarly, in

Kohler v.

Woolen, Brown & Hawkins,89

plaintiff's attorney failed to file a timely demand for arbitration
ble in evidence and (2) failure to mitigate damages is a defense. The con-

flict was resolved by holding offers of compromise inadmissible where an

issue of liability exists, but admissible on the issue of damages once liability is determined. 49 Ill. App. 3d at 681, 364 N.E.2d at 688. The Smiley rationale may require a bifurcated trial of liability and damages where mitigation
of damages is used by the defense.
86. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
87. 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977).
88. Id. at 73, 360 N.E.2d at 584. Interestingly, the trial court in a bench
trial awarded the plaintiff only $3,000. Apparently there was no claim on
appeal by plaintiff that the verdict was inadequate.
89. 15 Ill. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973).
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in an uninsured motorist case. Nevertheless, the case was arbitrated, and the clients were awarded $17,500 and $16,000. The insurer subsequently brought suit to set aside the arbitration
awards on the ground that the demands for arbitration were not
timely filed. The court held that the attorneys were estopped to
deny the facts they had pleaded in the arbitration proceeding.
Accordingly, the arbitrator's awards were admissible on the issue of damages. 90
As in other situations, a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his
damages. In Smiley v. Manchester Insurance& Indemnity Co.,91
this rule recently conflicted with the principle that offers of compromise are inadmissible as evidence. An insurance company's
former attorney failed to communicate to the original plaintiff an
offer to settle, thereby exposing the insurer to greater liability
because of its bad faith. In directing a verdict for the insurer
against its former attorney, the court held that an offer of compromise is inadmissible when a question of liability exists, but
admissible on the issue of damages once liability has been determined.92 Smiley seems to require bifurcated trials as to liability and damages when a mitigation of damages defense is
pleaded.
Since Goldizen v. Poole,93 it has been accepted that the client can recover only for injuries actually sustained. Accordingly, it has been assumed that an Illinois plaintiff would not be
permitted to recover more in a malpractice action than the
amount that could have been awarded in trying the original action. Consequently, it has been argued that if the plaintiff were
bound to pay attorney's fees in the underlying action, the
amount of those fees should be deducted from the malpractice
recovery sum.

94

California courts have been most reluctant to permit a negligent attorney to reduce the award to plaintiff by the amount of
the contingency fees recoverable had the original suit been successfully litigated. In rejecting an attorney's argument that a
person should not recover greater damages than he could have
had both parties to the contract fully performed, one court refused to deduct attorneys' fees, stating: "One whose wrongful
conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of damages
cannot complain because the court must make an estimate of
90. Id. at 458, 304 N.E.2d at 679.
2d 306, 375 N.E.2d
91. 49 Ill.
App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1977), a.f'd, 71 Ill.
118 (1978).
92. 49 Ill.
App. 3d at 681, 364 N.E.2d at 688.
93. 82 111. App. 469 (1898).
94. J. MIRZA, ILLINOIS TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.2 (1974); see Childs v.
Comstock, 69 A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902).
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damages rather than an actual computation. '95 The court also
noted that because the attorney had failed to file a counterclaim
for his actual services, the question of payment for services was
not properly before the court.
As in other areas of tort law, punitive damages may be
awarded if the attorney is guilty of willful misconduct. 96 While
damages,
no Illinois court has awarded punitive malpractice
97
there is no theoretical bar to their imposition.
ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION

The problem of when an action for legal malpractice accrues
almost always arises in the context of a defense that a statute of
limitations has run, barring plaintiffs claim. It had been held
over a half century ago that an action for legal malpractice arises
at the time of the negligent act. 98 Since that time, however, Illinois has applied the "discovery" rule to other types of professional malpractice, finding that the action arises when the
plaintiff learns of his injury or reasonably should have learned
of it. 99
An Illinois appellate court applied the discovery rule to legal
malpractice actions in Kohler v. Wollen, Brown & Hawkins.10 0
In Kohler, the alleged malpractice occurred in 1964, the damages
95. Benard v. Walkup, 272 Cal. App. 2d 595, 601, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544, 551
(1969) (court also noted that the attorney had failed to file a counterclaim
for his services).
96. See Public Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Barrett, 44 Ill. App. 3d 452, 458, 357
N.E.2d 1232, 1238 (1976) (amendment of complaint to include prayer for punitive damages allowed where defendant is aware from nature of complaint
that plaintiffs intend to prove willful misconduct).
97. In Hill v. Montgomery, 184 Ill. 220, 56 N.E. 320 (1900), a woman, who
was told by her attorney that she was divorced when she was not, was
awarded $5,000 damages. Today, this situation would probably be deemed
fraud or a case of outrageous conduct within the rule allowing damages for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
98. Maloney v. Graham, 171 Ill. App. 409 (1912). See also Dolce v.
Gamberdino, 60 Ill. App. 3d 124, 376 N.E.2d 273 (1978) (statute of limitations
arises at the time of the negligent act).
99. E.g., Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (surveying
malpractice); accord,Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d
450 (1970) (medical malpractice). Illinois courts have consistently held, in
medical malpractice cases, that the statute of limitations starts to run from
the date when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the last element necessary to his cause of action. Lind v. Zekman, 77 I. App. 3d 432,
395 N.E.2d 964 (1979); Kristina v. St. James Hosp., 63 Ill. App. 3d 810, 380
N.E.2d 816 (1978); Roper v. Markle, 59 Ill. App. 3d 706, 375 N.E.2d 934 (1978).
Three years ago, however, the Illinois legislature shortened the limitations
for doctors and hospitals without regard to these "discovery" principles.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1977). The statute reads in pertinent part:
"No action for damages ...

shall be brought more than 4 years after the

date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence......
App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973).
100. 15 Ill.
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were ascertained in 1970, and the actions were filed in 1970 and
1971. Finding that the actions were timely commenced, the
court held that an action does not accrue "until the client discovers or should have discovered the facts establishing the elements of the cause of action."''1 1 The Kohler court found
persuasive the reasoning of Neel v. Magana,0 2 where the California Supreme Court took cognizance of laymen's difficulties in
ascertaining the existence or effect of various elements of legal
malpractice:
A client may not recognize the negligence of a professional when
he sees it, and if he must ascertain malpractice at the moment of its
occurrence, the client must hire a second professional to check the
work of the first, which would be an impractical duplication and
would destroy the confidential
relationship between the practi10 3
tioner and his client.
In a companion case to Neel, the court decided that even
when a plaintiff-client immediately recognizes his attorney's
negligence, but does not sustain damages until years later, the
cause of action does not accrue until the damages are realized.'0 4 Therefore, the action for legal malpractice was held not
to accrue until the last event necessary to create the cause of
action occurred.
ABATEMENT OR SURVIVAL OF THE ACTION

0 5
an Illinois appellate court ruled that
In McGill v. Lazarro,1
an action for legal malpractice survives the death of the defendant. In reaching its decision, the court applied two tests. First, it
determined that the accrued action was "personal property"
within the meaning of the Illinois Survival Statute. 10 6 Second,
the court noted that since causes of actions for fraud, negligence, and bad faith can be assigned, this claim was also assignable and therefore survived the death of either party. The court
explicitly rejected a prior decision and found that a legal mal10 7
practice action survives the attorney's death.

101. Id. at 460, 304 N.E.2d at 681.
102. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
103. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
104. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
105. 62 Ill. App. 3d 151, 379 N.E.2d 16 (1978).
106. Id. at 154, 379 N.E.2d at 18. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 339 (1975)
(now contained in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110%, § 27-6 (1977)).
107. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 154, 379 N.E.2d at 18. The court rejected the holding
App. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 81 (1966) (malpracof Butterman v. Chamales, 73 Ill.
tice action against attorney did not survive his death since the cause of ac-

tion lies in tort, not in contract). The McGill holding was supported by
Jones v. Siesennop, 55 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 371 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (action for

professional negligence against an attorney survived the death of the plaintiff).
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What should the result be when plaintiff has not yet discovered the existence of his action against an attorney at the time
of the latter's death? Although Illinois law is silent, it has been
assumed that if the action has not yet accrued at the attorney's
death, the possibility of future action is not "personal property,"
and therefore it cannot survive. This unfortuitous result in a society where attorneys are insured seems unjust and unwarranted.
CONCLUSION

Legal malpractice actions have affected nearly every Illinois
attorney in some manner and have arisen in many substantive
areas of the law. 10 8 Whether the prevalence of the cause of action is beneficial is no longer disputed. 10 9 Many problems concerning evidentiary standards in the proof of legal malpractice,
procedural devices, and scope of issues to be litigated are still
unresolved in Illinois. Many of these issues have already been
decided in other states, however.
While Illinois imposes a higher standard of care on trial lawyers than do other states, Illinois is less exacting in formulating
the lawyer's duty to research and less harsh in the computation
of damages. To the extent of current case law, Illinois limits
malpractice liability in cases involving non-client third parties.
In other respects, however, legal malpractice in Illinois parallels
medical malpractice in this state and legal malpractice nationwide.
The expectations of clients have always been high, and they
108. Some examples of the affected areas are: (1) appeals, see, e.g.,
Trustees of Schools of Township 42 N. v. Schroeder, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 278
N.E.2d 431 (1971); (2) personal injury claims, see, e.g., House v. Maddox, 46
Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977); Kohler v. Woolen, Brown & Hawkins, 15
Ill. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973); (3) releases, see, e.g., Pennington v.
Jones, 46 Ill. App. 3d 65, 360 N.E.2d 566 (1977); (4) securities, see, e.g., Brown
v. Gitlin, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1974); (5) real estate transactions, see, e.g., Miller v. Schultz, 53 Ill. App. 3d 721, 368 N.E.2d 1141 (1977);
(6) abstracting, see, e.g., Chase v. Heaney, 70 Ill. 268 (1873); (7) creditordebtor matters, see, e.g., Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908).
Although none have yet been successful, several cases have been litigated in the criminal defense field. E.g., Ehn v. Price, 372 F. Supp. 151 (N.D.
Ill. 1974). In several other cases, negligence has been alleged in the context
of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Knippenberg, 66 Ill. 2d 276, 362
N.E.2d 681 (1977); People v. Allen, 132 Ill. App. 2d 1015, 270 N.E.2d 54 (1971).
There are other areas in which malpractice actions have been litigated
in Illinois. The aforementioned areas and authorities are intended to convey only the variety of subject matter found in legal malpractice suits.
109. See J. MIRZA, ILLINOIS TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.2 (1974) (the author, a leading Illinois trial lawyer, has suggested that "a few good legal malpractice actions would help a great deal in increasing the ethics of the
Bar").
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continue to increase. Formal certification of specialists may satisfy these expectations and may serve to clarify the various duties imposed on attorneys. 10 To the lament of the negligent
attorney and to the benefit of the bar, the continuous pursuit of
the negligent attorney will produce the judicial response that is
necessary to protect the consumer of legal services and to define
the duties and responsibilities of every member of the practicing bar. Later and perhaps lengthier legal malpractice chapters
will be read by consumer and lawyer alike with great interest.

110. The fact that specialization would have these effects does not necessarily mean that specialization for the Bar is desirable. It is beyond the
scope of this article to address the merits of or problems 'With legal specialization generally.

